The characteristic behaviour of the Prosperity Party (PP) of speaking with a forked tongue is once again on full display.
In a press statement issued by Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, apparently in response to the El-Alamein Declaration, Addis Ababa pays lip service to “peaceful engagement, mutual respect, and regional cooperation.” It further urges “all regional actors to address shared challenges through constructive dialogue, partnership, and adherence to the principles of good neighborliness.”
But this is precisely the crux of the matter.
The PP’s diplomatic rhetoric notwithstanding, the prevailing tensions gripping the Horn of Africa cannot be divorced from the policies and actions pursued by Addis Ababa over the past several years—policies that have undermined international law and the prospects for genuine regional cooperation.
Ethiopia and access to the ports of the Horn
Ethiopia has access to the ports of the Horn of Africa through commercial and transit arrangements. In what can reasonably be described as a buyers’ market, it has considerable latitude to enter into mutually beneficial commercial agreements with the coastal states concerned.
Yet the Prosperity Party has chosen to pursue an agenda of aggression and confrontation against Eritrea in an effort to acquire what it calls “sovereign access to the sea.”
This approach disregards the fundamental distinction between commercial access and sovereignty.
A landlocked country’s legitimate need for access to international markets can be addressed through negotiated commercial arrangements. It does not confer sovereign rights over the territory of a neighbouring coastal state.
Assab and the question of strategic depth
As spelled out in previous public statements by Ethiopia’s foreign-policy establishment, the issue has also extended beyond the port of Assab itself.
The argument has been advanced that:
“Without the protective depth offered by the Dahlak islands, Assab remains an exposed coastal facility vulnerable to hostile naval power…”
and that any enduring arrangement for Ethiopia would therefore have to consider both access to the coast and the strategic depth required to protect that access.
This raises a fundamental question.
If access to Assab requires consideration of the surrounding southern coastal zone and the Dahlak Islands, then the issue can no longer be presented merely as a question of commercial port access.
It becomes a question of territorial sovereignty and integrity.
Somalia and Sudan
The same pattern, according to Minister Yemane Gebremeskel, can be seen in Ethiopia’s relations with Somalia and developments surrounding Sudan.
The memorandum of understanding signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland has been rejected by Somalia as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Ethiopia has also faced allegations concerning support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, including allegations of assistance linked to the United Arab Emirates. These allegations remain politically contested, but they form part of the broader regional security concerns surrounding Ethiopia’s foreign policy.
From Eritrea’s perspective, such developments have contributed unnecessarily to tensions that could instead be addressed through respect for sovereignty, dialogue and genuine regional cooperation.
Geographical proximity does not create sovereign rights
Finally, the suggestion that Ethiopia’s geographical proximity to the Red Sea somehow entitles it to the rights and responsibilities of the littoral states is, in legal terms, without foundation.
Geography may determine economic interests and strategic considerations. It does not, however, create sovereignty.
Ethiopia is a landlocked state. Eritrea is a littoral state.
Ethiopia’s need for reliable access to international trade routes can be addressed through commercial agreements, transit arrangements and cooperation with coastal neighbours. It cannot create a sovereign entitlement to another state’s coastline.
The distinction is fundamental:
Access is not sovereignty.
Commercial use is not territorial ownership.
Geographical proximity is not a legal title.
If Addis Ababa genuinely seeks peaceful engagement, mutual respect and good-neighborliness, those principles must be reflected not only in diplomatic statements but also in state conduct.
For Eritrea, the issue is therefore clear: regional cooperation must be based on respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity—not on claims derived from geography, strategic necessity or economic interest.