In a press statement issued by Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, apparently in response to the El-Alamein Declaration, Addis Ababa pays lip service to “peaceful engagement, mutual respect, and regional cooperation.” It further urges “all regional actors to address shared challenges through constructive dialogue, partnership, and adherence to the principles of good neighborliness.”

But this is precisely the crux of the matter.

The PP’s diplomatic rhetoric notwithstanding, the prevailing tensions gripping the Horn of Africa cannot be divorced from the policies and actions pursued by Addis Ababa over the past several years—policies that have undermined international law and the prospects for genuine regional cooperation.

Ethiopia and access to the ports of the Horn

Ethiopia has access to the ports of the Horn of Africa through commercial and transit arrangements. In what can reasonably be described as a buyers’ market, it has considerable latitude to enter into mutually beneficial commercial agreements with the coastal states concerned.

Yet the Prosperity Party has chosen to pursue an agenda of aggression and confrontation against Eritrea in an effort to acquire what it calls “sovereign access to the sea.”

This approach disregards the fundamental distinction between commercial access and sovereignty.

A landlocked country’s legitimate need for access to international markets can be addressed through negotiated commercial arrangements. It does not confer sovereign rights over the territory of a neighbouring coastal state.

Assab and the question of strategic depth

As spelled out in previous public statements by Ethiopia’s foreign-policy establishment, the issue has also extended beyond the port of Assab itself.

The argument has been advanced that:

“Without the protective depth offered by the Dahlak islands, Assab remains an exposed coastal facility vulnerable to hostile naval power…”

and that any enduring arrangement for Ethiopia would therefore have to consider both access to the coast and the strategic depth required to protect that access.

This raises a fundamental question.

If access to Assab requires consideration of the surrounding southern coastal zone and the Dahlak Islands, then the issue can no longer be presented merely as a question of commercial port access.

It becomes a question of territorial sovereignty and integrity.

Somalia and Sudan

The same pattern, according to Minister Yemane Gebremeskel, can be seen in Ethiopia’s relations with Somalia and developments surrounding Sudan.

The memorandum of understanding signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland has been rejected by Somalia as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Ethiopia has also faced allegations concerning support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, including allegations of assistance linked to the United Arab Emirates. These allegations remain politically contested, but they form part of the broader regional security concerns surrounding Ethiopia’s foreign policy.

From Eritrea’s perspective, such developments have contributed unnecessarily to tensions that could instead be addressed through respect for sovereignty, dialogue and genuine regional cooperation.

Geographical proximity does not create sovereign rights

Finally, the suggestion that Ethiopia’s geographical proximity to the Red Sea somehow entitles it to the rights and responsibilities of the littoral states is, in legal terms, without foundation.

Geography may determine economic interests and strategic considerations. It does not, however, create sovereignty.

Ethiopia is a landlocked state. Eritrea is a littoral state.

Ethiopia’s need for reliable access to international trade routes can be addressed through commercial agreements, transit arrangements and cooperation with coastal neighbours. It cannot create a sovereign entitlement to another state’s coastline.

The distinction is fundamental:

Access is not sovereignty.
Commercial use is not territorial ownership.
Geographical proximity is not a legal title.

If Addis Ababa genuinely seeks peaceful engagement, mutual respect and good-neighborliness, those principles must be reflected not only in diplomatic statements but also in state conduct.

For Eritrea, the issue is therefore clear: regional cooperation must be based on respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity—not on claims derived from geography, strategic necessity or economic interest.

The current hetoric directed at Eritrea raises a broader question about political consistency. The accusation that Eritrea is acting as a subordinate or proxy can also be viewed as an attempt to project onto Eritrea the very dynamics that critics associate with their own political relationships and external alignments.

That is where the charge of duplicity enters the debate.

Eritrea has consistently placed sovereignty and independent decision making at the centre of its foreign policy. Whether one agrees with every aspect of that policy or not, Eritrea’s position is that its national interests cannot be defined by another government, political party, or external power.

This principle is particularly important in the Horn of Africa, where political relationships have frequently been shaped by competing regional interests and external involvement. Cooperation between states is legitimate and necessary, but cooperation does not remove the political independence of the parties involved.

For Eritrea, the issue is therefore not whether it should cooperate with others. The issue is the terms on which that cooperation takes place.

A relationship based on mutual recognition allows both sides to maintain their political agency. A relationship in which one side expects compliance from the other creates a fundamentally different dynamic.

Eritrea’s insistence on sovereignty should therefore be understood within that context. Its refusal to accept political direction from outside is part of a broader position that national decisions should remain the responsibility of the Eritrean state.

The same standard should apply to every country and every political actor in the region.

If sovereignty is considered legitimate for one state, it cannot be treated as conditional for another.

For Eritrea, sovereignty is not a negotiating position. It is the basis from which its external relationships are approached.

The Ethiopian Government issued a Press Statement today announcing the closure of the Eritrean Embassy in Ethiopia, as well as declaring ten Eritrean diplomats, including the Chargé d’Affaires and other Eritrean diplomats accredited to the African Union, persona non grata.

To justify these unwarranted acts of hostility, the Ethiopian Government has turned the tables and accused Eritrea of “direct and indirect acts of hostility and belligerence against Ethiopia.”

This is astounding indeed.

In reality, it is Ethiopia that has been pursuing an agenda of incessant hostility — in effect, a publicly pronounced declaration of war — against Eritrea for three years, in pursuit of “the imperative of acquiring sovereign access to the sea” through the invasion of sovereign Eritrean ports and coastal areas.

In parallel with these aggressive intentions, Ethiopia has gone further to host, train, and provide arms to an assortment of what it calls “Eritrean armed opposition groups” in an effort to stoke internal conflict and pursue “regime change” in Eritrea.

Throughout these trying times, Eritrea has displayed patience and restraint in the hope of averting a dangerous escalation.

In the current circumstances, however, Eritrea has no option but to reciprocate in kind and sever all diplomatic ties with Ethiopia, with all the negative corollaries that this entails.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Asmara

1 October 2026