In a press statement issued by Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, apparently in response to the El-Alamein Declaration, Addis Ababa pays lip service to “peaceful engagement, mutual respect, and regional cooperation.” It further urges “all regional actors to address shared challenges through constructive dialogue, partnership, and adherence to the principles of good neighborliness.”

But this is precisely the crux of the matter.

The PP’s diplomatic rhetoric notwithstanding, the prevailing tensions gripping the Horn of Africa cannot be divorced from the policies and actions pursued by Addis Ababa over the past several years—policies that have undermined international law and the prospects for genuine regional cooperation.

Ethiopia and access to the ports of the Horn

Ethiopia has access to the ports of the Horn of Africa through commercial and transit arrangements. In what can reasonably be described as a buyers’ market, it has considerable latitude to enter into mutually beneficial commercial agreements with the coastal states concerned.

Yet the Prosperity Party has chosen to pursue an agenda of aggression and confrontation against Eritrea in an effort to acquire what it calls “sovereign access to the sea.”

This approach disregards the fundamental distinction between commercial access and sovereignty.

A landlocked country’s legitimate need for access to international markets can be addressed through negotiated commercial arrangements. It does not confer sovereign rights over the territory of a neighbouring coastal state.

Assab and the question of strategic depth

As spelled out in previous public statements by Ethiopia’s foreign-policy establishment, the issue has also extended beyond the port of Assab itself.

The argument has been advanced that:

“Without the protective depth offered by the Dahlak islands, Assab remains an exposed coastal facility vulnerable to hostile naval power…”

and that any enduring arrangement for Ethiopia would therefore have to consider both access to the coast and the strategic depth required to protect that access.

This raises a fundamental question.

If access to Assab requires consideration of the surrounding southern coastal zone and the Dahlak Islands, then the issue can no longer be presented merely as a question of commercial port access.

It becomes a question of territorial sovereignty and integrity.

Somalia and Sudan

The same pattern, according to Minister Yemane Gebremeskel, can be seen in Ethiopia’s relations with Somalia and developments surrounding Sudan.

The memorandum of understanding signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland has been rejected by Somalia as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Ethiopia has also faced allegations concerning support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, including allegations of assistance linked to the United Arab Emirates. These allegations remain politically contested, but they form part of the broader regional security concerns surrounding Ethiopia’s foreign policy.

From Eritrea’s perspective, such developments have contributed unnecessarily to tensions that could instead be addressed through respect for sovereignty, dialogue and genuine regional cooperation.

Geographical proximity does not create sovereign rights

Finally, the suggestion that Ethiopia’s geographical proximity to the Red Sea somehow entitles it to the rights and responsibilities of the littoral states is, in legal terms, without foundation.

Geography may determine economic interests and strategic considerations. It does not, however, create sovereignty.

Ethiopia is a landlocked state. Eritrea is a littoral state.

Ethiopia’s need for reliable access to international trade routes can be addressed through commercial agreements, transit arrangements and cooperation with coastal neighbours. It cannot create a sovereign entitlement to another state’s coastline.

The distinction is fundamental:

Access is not sovereignty.
Commercial use is not territorial ownership.
Geographical proximity is not a legal title.

If Addis Ababa genuinely seeks peaceful engagement, mutual respect and good-neighborliness, those principles must be reflected not only in diplomatic statements but also in state conduct.

For Eritrea, the issue is therefore clear: regional cooperation must be based on respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity—not on claims derived from geography, strategic necessity or economic interest.

The joint declaration focused on sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference and regional cooperation. These principles are particularly relevant to Eritrea, given its position on the Red Sea and its wider security interests in the Horn of Africa.

The participants discussed the security of the Red Sea and the importance of freedom of navigation. They also emphasized the role of the Red Sea littoral states in addressing security and governance issues affecting the waterway.

For Eritrea, participation in the summit provides a direct regional forum to address issues affecting its security and its relations with neighboring states. The format also places Eritrea alongside Egypt, Sudan and Somalia in discussions concerning the wider Red Sea and Horn of Africa region.

Sudan was another major issue on the agenda. The four countries reaffirmed their support for Sudan’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity and called for efforts toward a political resolution of the conflict.

The summit also addressed Somalia, including the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and the wider security situation in the country.

On the Nile, the participating states emphasized cooperation and the application of international law to shared water resources.

One of the practical outcomes was an agreement to maintain regular consultations between the four countries. This creates a continuing mechanism for discussing regional developments rather than relying only on occasional summit meetings.

From an Eritrean perspective, the importance of the meeting lies primarily in its regional setting. Eritrea participated as a sovereign Red Sea and Horn of Africa state, with its own security interests and foreign-policy priorities.

The summit does not resolve the region’s disputes, but it establishes a framework for continued political consultation among four states with significant interests in the same strategic region.

The leaders of Eritrea, Egypt, Sudan and Somalia are set to meet on Sunday, Octber 4, in New Alamein, Egypt, for the Alamein Consultative Summit.

The meeting will bring together President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt, Chairman of Sudan’s Sovereign Council Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia.

According to the Egyptian Presidency, the summit is intended for consultation and coordination on regional issues of mutual interest. No detailed public agenda has been released at this stage.

The timing of the meeting is significant.

New Alamein is currently hosting a series of high-level African gatherings, including the Alamein Africa Forum and the eighth African Union Mid-Year Coordination Meeting. Egypt has presented these events as platforms for African economic integration, development and wider continental cooperation.

The four-way meeting also takes place against a rapidly changing regional environment.

Relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia have recently deteriorated following Ethiopia’s closure of its embassy in Asmara and the expulsion of Eritrean diplomats. Eritrea subsequently closed Ethiopia’s diplomatic mission in Asmara. Egypt and Ethiopia have also exchanged diplomatic expulsions.

At the same time, developments across the Horn of Africa, Sudan and the Red Sea continue to connect questions of national sovereignty, regional security, maritime stability and political relations among neighbouring states.

For Eritrea, the Red Sea is not a secondary issue. Its coastline places the country directly within one of the most strategically important maritime regions connecting Africa, the Middle East and the wider Indian Ocean.

For Egypt, the security of the Red Sea is closely connected to national and regional interests, including the stability of the Nile Basin and maritime routes. Cairo has repeatedly emphasized the importance of regional coordination and the role of Red Sea littoral states in matters concerning the sea.

Sudan brings another critical dimension to the discussion. The continuing conflict has significant consequences for the security and political stability of the wider Horn of Africa and for neighbouring countries.

Somalia likewise remains central to regional security discussions, given its position along the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean.

The importance of the Alamein meeting therefore lies not simply in the number of leaders attending, but in the fact that four states with direct interests in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, the Nile Basin and the Gulf of Aden will be sitting at the same regional table.

What emerges from the meeting will depend on the discussions themselves. At present, the Egyptian Presidency has described the gathering primarily as a framework for consultation and coordination on issues of common regional concern.

The meeting will therefore be closely watched for any concrete positions concerning regional security, sovereignty, stability, diplomatic coordination and cooperation among the four states.

Sources:

• Egyptian Presidency
• Egyptian State Information Service

President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea is in Egypt for a working visit at the invitation of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, according to the Eritrean Ministry of Information.

The Eritrean Ministry of Information states that President Isaias will participate in a Summit of Heads of State on collective security, stability and partnership. The discussions cover the wider regional neighbourhood, including the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Gulf and Nile Basin. President Isaias and President el-Sisi are also expected to discuss the strengthening of bilateral relations between Eritrea and Egypt.

The visit comes as Egypt hosts the Alamein Africa Forum in New Alamein from October 2 to 4. President el-Sisi is scheduled to inaugurate the forum on October 3, with African leaders, government representatives, business leaders and African and international economic institutions taking part, according to Egypt’s State Information Service.

The African Union has also confirmed the gathering in New Alamein, bringing together African leaders, institutions and representatives of the private sector to discuss continental development priorities and their implementation.

Eritrea’s engagement comes at a time when the Red Sea and its surrounding maritime and regional spaces remain central to discussions on security, stability and cooperation.

Egypt and Eritrea have also emphasized the importance of cooperation on Red Sea affairs. In recent diplomatic discussions, Egypt stressed that security and governance of the Red Sea are the responsibility of the Red Sea littoral states.

President Isaias Afwerki’s visit places Eritrea–Egypt relations within a broader regional diplomatic setting involving African cooperation, Red Sea security and relations among neighbouring states.

Sources

• Eritrea Ministry of Information
• Egyptian State Information Service
• African Union

The Ethiopian Government issued a Press Statement today announcing the closure of the Eritrean Embassy in Ethiopia, as well as declaring ten Eritrean diplomats, including the Chargé d’Affaires and other Eritrean diplomats accredited to the African Union, persona non grata.

To justify these unwarranted acts of hostility, the Ethiopian Government has turned the tables and accused Eritrea of “direct and indirect acts of hostility and belligerence against Ethiopia.”

This is astounding indeed.

In reality, it is Ethiopia that has been pursuing an agenda of incessant hostility — in effect, a publicly pronounced declaration of war — against Eritrea for three years, in pursuit of “the imperative of acquiring sovereign access to the sea” through the invasion of sovereign Eritrean ports and coastal areas.

In parallel with these aggressive intentions, Ethiopia has gone further to host, train, and provide arms to an assortment of what it calls “Eritrean armed opposition groups” in an effort to stoke internal conflict and pursue “regime change” in Eritrea.

Throughout these trying times, Eritrea has displayed patience and restraint in the hope of averting a dangerous escalation.

In the current circumstances, however, Eritrea has no option but to reciprocate in kind and sever all diplomatic ties with Ethiopia, with all the negative corollaries that this entails.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Asmara

1 October 2026

The United States has removed sanctions imposed on the Eritrean Defense Forces and other Eritrean entities, according to a September 18 notice from the U.S. Department of the Treasury reported by Reuters. The sanctions were originally imposed in 2021 during the conflict in northern Ethiopia. Reuters reports that Eritrea’s Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel welcomed the removal, describing the earlier measures as unwarranted and damaging to Eritrea.

For Eritreans, however, the significance of this moment reaches beyond the lifting of a designation.

It touches something much older: the experience of a people who have spent generations learning to endure pressure without surrendering their sense of national sovereignty.

Eritrea’s resilience was not created by sanctions, and it will not disappear with their removal.
It was formed long before today’s diplomatic language.
It was formed through a history in which Eritreans repeatedly confronted circumstances in which the existence, independence and political choices of the country were contested by forces far more powerful than Eritrea itself.

That history helps explain why Eritrean society has often viewed external pressure through a different lens from the one used in foreign capitals.

For many Eritreans, sanctions were never simply an entry on a government list. They were experienced within a much broader historical memory — a memory shaped by colonial rule, federation, annexation, armed struggle, independence and the continuing effort to protect sovereignty in one of the world’s most strategically contested regions.

The sanctions imposed in 2021 were connected by Washington to Eritrean actors and the war in northern Ethiopia. The U.S. Treasury at the time stated that the measures targeted the Eritrean Defense Force, the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice and other Eritrean entities and individuals under Executive Order 14046.

Five years later, the political circumstances have changed.
The sanctions have been removed.

But the deeper question is what this change tells us about Eritrea’s place in the region.

Eritrea sits on one of the most consequential maritime corridors in the world. Its coastline stretches along the Red Sea, facing one of the world’s most strategically important waterways. Reuters noted that the renewed attention to the Red Sea and the region’s changing security environment has increased the strategic significance of Eritrea’s location.

This is where Eritrea’s history and geography meet.

A country does not choose its geography.
Eritrea did not choose to stand beside the Red Sea, next to the Bab el-Mandeb, at the meeting point of Africa and the Middle East. But generations of Eritreans have understood that geography brings both opportunity and vulnerability.

The Red Sea has always been more than water surrounding the country.
It has been a corridor of civilizations, commerce, military competition and political influence.
And Eritrea has remained there through all of it.
That continuity matters.

The removal of sanctions does not erase the disputes and competing interpretations surrounding the wars of the region. Nor does one policy decision rewrite the historical record. But it does demonstrate something important about international politics: policies change as circumstances change, and relationships that once deteriorated can also move in another direction.

For Eritreans, this is precisely why national resilience has mattered.
Resilience is not the absence of hardship.
It is the ability to remain standing while hardship changes form.

At different moments, Eritrea has faced military pressure, diplomatic isolation, economic restrictions and international campaigns of criticism. The country’s response has repeatedly been shaped by the conviction that its national interests cannot simply be outsourced to external powers.

That conviction has deep roots.
The independence struggle itself was built around an insistence that Eritreans should determine Eritrea’s future.
That principle did not begin with independence in 1993.

It was forged through decades of struggle.
It survived war.
It survived displacement.
It survived political isolation.
And it survived the difficult years that followed independence.

This is why the removal of sanctions should not be understood simply as a victory over another country, nor as the end of every disagreement between Eritrea and the outside world.

It is better understood as another chapter in a much longer story.

A story in which Eritrea has repeatedly been forced to navigate an international environment where powerful states pursue their own strategic interests, regional alliances shift, and yesterday’s assumptions can become today’s liabilities.

Eritrea remains.
That is the part of the story that is easiest to overlook.

International headlines often move rapidly from one crisis to another. Governments change positions. Alliances evolve. Sanctions are imposed and later removed. Strategic priorities shift.

But countries with long historical memories measure time differently.

For Eritreans, resilience is measured across generations.

It is found in the memory of those who fought.
In the families who endured separation.
In communities that rebuilt after destruction.
In a generation that carried education, culture and national identity through extraordinary circumstances.
And in a people who continue to see sovereignty not as an abstract diplomatic word, but as something purchased through sacrifice.

The September 2026 decision therefore deserves to be viewed within that longer context.

The United States has changed its position toward Eritrean entities that were sanctioned in 2021. Eritrea has welcomed the measure. Reuters has also noted the potential significance of Eritrea’s strategic position along the Red Sea.

What comes next will depend on politics, diplomacy and the interests of the states involved.

But one thing is already clear.

Eritrea’s story did not begin with the sanctions.
And it will not be defined by their removal.

The deeper story is the endurance of a nation that has spent much of its modern history navigating pressure from outside while attempting to preserve its own political space.

That is what resilience means in the Eritrean context.

Not the absence of pressure.
Not the absence of hardship.
But the refusal to allow either to determine the final chapter.

Eritrea remains a country shaped by its history, its geography and the determination of its people to decide its future.

And history, as Eritreans know better than most, is rarely finished when the headlines disappear.

General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his accompanying delegation were warmly received by President Isaias Afwerki upon their arrival at Asmara International Airport.

The current visit forms part of the periodic consultative framework between the two sisterly countries, reflecting the importance both Eritrea and Sudan attach to direct dialogue and regular exchange at the highest level.

Strengthening Bilateral Relations

During the working visit, President Isaias Afwerki and General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan will discuss the enhancement of bilateral ties, as well as regional and international issues of mutual interest.

The consultations come against the backdrop of a rapidly evolving Horn of Africa and Red Sea region, where stability, sovereignty, security, and constructive relations between neighbouring countries remain of fundamental importance.

For Eritrea and Sudan, maintaining regular communication provides an important avenue for addressing shared concerns and strengthening cooperation based on mutual interests and respect for national sovereignty.

Eritrea and Sudan: Neighbours with Shared Interests

Eritrea and Sudan are linked by geography, history, and longstanding ties between their peoples. Their proximity also means that developments affecting one country inevitably have implications for the wider regional environment.

Regular consultations between Asmara and Khartoum therefore represent more than routine diplomatic engagement. They provide an opportunity for the two neighbouring countries to exchange perspectives, coordinate where their interests converge, and reinforce channels of direct communication.

Eritrea has consistently emphasized the importance of regional countries taking ownership of their affairs and pursuing solutions through dialogue, while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.

Asmara’s Role in Regional Diplomacy

The visit by General al-Burhan once again highlights Asmara’s role as an important venue for regional political consultations.

President Isaias Afwerki’s engagement with neighbouring countries has placed strong emphasis on direct dialogue and frank discussions concerning developments in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.

The meeting with General al-Burhan provides another opportunity for such consultations, particularly on issues of mutual concern to Eritrea and Sudan.

A Continued Commitment to Dialogue

The working visit underscores the value both countries place on maintaining direct, high-level communication.

At a time of profound challenges across the region, strong relations between neighbouring states are increasingly important. Eritrea and Sudan’s continued consultative framework offers a channel through which the two countries can discuss their interests, strengthen bilateral ties, and exchange views on regional and international developments.

General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s arrival in Asmara is therefore not simply a diplomatic visit. It is a reaffirmation of the enduring relationship between Eritrea and Sudan and of their commitment to continued consultation, mutual respect, and cooperation.

Asmara remains a place where regional issues can be discussed directly, openly, and with the interests of neighbouring countries at the center of the conversation.

According to the reports, an urgent meeting was convened within the Ethiopian armed forces and chaired by the Chief of Staff. The meeting was reportedly focused on assessing developments on the ground and reviewing military strategies in response to changing conditions.

The reported developments, if independently confirmed, could indicate a significant shift in the military landscape.

Military Preparations Reported Across Multiple Fronts

The reports point to increased military preparations in several strategically important areas, including locations along the Sudanese border in western Ethiopia, the Raya–Alamata area in the north, and Bure and Mille in the east.

The concentration of forces and preparations across geographically separated areas could place additional pressure on government forces, particularly if developments on several fronts occur simultaneously.

However, the precise scale and purpose of these deployments remain difficult to independently verify.

FANO and the Changing Situation in Amhara

Particular attention is being focused on the Amhara region, where fighting between government forces and FANO has continued to shape Ethiopia’s security situation.

According to the report, FANO has increasingly sought to move beyond a predominantly guerrilla-style approach and toward more active counteroffensive operations.

The same report alleges that FANO has received support from actors including Tigray, Eritrea, and Egypt. These claims remain allegations and have not been independently established. They should therefore be treated with caution until supported by reliable, independent evidence.

Nevertheless, any significant improvement in FANO’s organization, coordination, or operational capabilities could create additional challenges for the federal government.

Raya–Alamata: A Strategic Flashpoint

The Raya–Alamata area is described in the reports as one of the most strategically sensitive locations.

The region has significant military and logistical importance, and developments there could affect supply routes and the movement of forces.

The reports also claim that Tigrayan forces have been active in the wider area, including references to the so-called 31st unit. These claims likewise require independent verification.

If confirmed, increased military activity around Raya–Alamata could further complicate the federal government’s ability to maintain secure and reliable lines of communication.

A Shift Toward Defensive Positions?

Another key claim in the reports is that Ethiopian government forces have reconsidered some previous operational plans and moved toward more defensive deployments.

Particular attention has been placed on the strategic importance of the Mille route. According to the reports, concerns over the possibility of disruption along this route have influenced military planning.

The reports further suggest that plans for a western advance toward Tigray may have been put aside in favor of strengthening defensive positions.

Whether these changes represent a temporary tactical adjustment or a broader strategic shift remains unclear.

A Potential Turning Point?

If the reported developments are confirmed, Ethiopia’s federal forces could be facing a more complicated military environment than previously acknowledged.

Pressure across multiple regions would present a significant strategic challenge, requiring the government to divide resources, secure supply routes, and maintain operational capacity across several areas simultaneously.

At the same time, it would be premature to describe the situation as a definitive military turning point.

The actual balance of power will depend on factors including troop numbers, logistics, command and control, territorial control, external support, and the ability of the various armed groups to coordinate their operations.

What Comes Next?

Ethiopia remains one of the most strategically important countries in the Horn of Africa, and any major change in its internal security situation could have consequences beyond its borders.

For now, the reports point to a potentially significant period of military reassessment.

Whether the Ethiopian government is genuinely losing strategic momentum, or is simply adapting its forces to a changing battlefield, will become clearer through developments on the ground.

One thing is certain: Ethiopia’s military situation remains highly fluid, and the coming weeks could prove critical in determining whether the current pressure develops into a broader strategic shift.

Recent analyses by Deutsche Welle and Foreign Policy Journal regarding Eritrea’s growing strategic importance in the Horn of Africa raise an important question: Is Eritrea being assessed on its own geopolitical and historical realities, or is it still being viewed primarily through an Ethiopia-centered lens?

Eritrea is unquestionably a strategically important state. Its position along the Red Sea, close to one of the world’s most consequential maritime corridors, and its relations with regional and international actors make it an important factor in the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa.

But beneath the current debate lies a more fundamental question:

Can economic interest in a port ever create a claim to sovereignty over another sovereign state’s territory?
The answer under international law is clear: No.

Port Access Is Not Sovereignty

Ethiopia’s status as a landlocked country presents genuine economic challenges. Access to seaports is essential for trade, supply chains and economic development.

But economic necessity does not create territorial entitlement.

Landlocked states around the world conduct international commerce through neighboring coastal countries through bilateral and multilateral agreements. Trade corridors, transit arrangements, port agreements and commercial partnerships can serve mutual interests without compromising the territorial sovereignty of the coastal state.

That distinction must not be blurred in the Horn of Africa.

Commercial access can be negotiated. Sovereignty cannot.

Eritrea does not claim Ethiopian territory. It does not seek Ethiopian land or resources. Nor does Eritrea have a fundamental objection to Ethiopia pursuing legitimate commercial access to regional ports through mutually agreed arrangements.

What Eritrea rejects is the notion that economic size, demographic weight or geographic disadvantage can create an entitlement to another state’s sovereign territory.

Eritrea’s History Must Not Be Rewritten

The historical framing of Eritrea also matters.

Descriptions suggesting that Eritrea merely “split” from Ethiopia or that Eritrean independence “stripped” Ethiopia of its coastline risk reversing historical cause and effect.

The Eritrean people possess a distinct and ancient history that predates European colonialism by millennia. Like the modern borders of many African states, Eritrea’s contemporary territorial boundaries were consolidated during the colonial period. Italy formally established the colony of Eritrea in 1890.

Following the Second World War, Eritrea came under British Military Administration before being placed in a federal arrangement with Ethiopia.

That arrangement did not survive.

In 1962, the federation was unilaterally abolished and Eritrea was annexed by Ethiopia. What followed was three decades of armed struggle for independence.

In the internationally supervised referendum of 1993, 99.805 percent of Eritrean voters chose independence. Eritrea subsequently became a member of the United Nations.

To describe this historical process as Eritrea simply “taking” Ethiopia’s coastline is therefore not merely misleading—it obscures the political and historical reality behind Eritrea’s independence.

The Border Is Not an Open Invitation for Revision

The Eritrea-Ethiopia border question must also be understood within the framework of international law.

Following the 1998–2000 war, Eritrea and Ethiopia signed the Algiers Agreement and voluntarily submitted their territorial dispute to international arbitration.

The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission issued its delimitation decision in 2002, relying on the colonial treaties of 1900, 1902 and 1910 and applicable international law. Under the Algiers Agreement, the determination was final and binding.

This principle matters far beyond the two countries.

If African borders can be reopened whenever a state becomes economically stronger, more populous or strategically interested in the territory of a neighbor, then virtually no border on the continent is secure.

Africa cannot afford such a precedent.

Eritrea’s Foreign Policy Does Not Require an Ethiopia-Centered Explanation

Another recurring problem is the tendency to interpret Eritrea’s relations with Egypt, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United States and other partners primarily as components of an anti-Ethiopian strategy.

That interpretation is overly narrow.

Eritrea is a sovereign Red Sea nation. Its foreign policy naturally encompasses maritime security, regional stability, trade, investment, transportation, diplomacy and bilateral cooperation.

Not every Eritrean diplomatic relationship exists because of Ethiopia.

Reducing Eritrea’s international engagement to an Ethiopia-centered geopolitical contest diminishes Eritrea’s agency as a sovereign state.

Stability Should Be Analyzed on Its Own Terms

There is also a striking contradiction in some external assessments of Eritrea.

On one hand, Eritrea is acknowledged as comparatively stable, cohesive, strategically positioned and increasingly relevant to regional and international partners. On the other, those same characteristics are frequently overshadowed by labels such as “authoritarian,” “repressive” or “autocratic.”

Critical analysis of Eritrea’s political system is legitimate. But serious journalism should go beyond labels.

Eritrea’s political development cannot be separated from its colonial history, its decades-long independence struggle, regional wars, national institutions and its particular nation-building experience.

Criticism is part of journalism.
But understanding must come before judgment.

This Is About More Than Eritrea

The fundamental issue extends far beyond the Eritrea-Ethiopia relationship.

Africa’s interstate order depends on several basic principles: sovereign equality, territorial integrity and respect for internationally recognized boundaries.

Those principles cannot apply selectively.

If a larger state can claim special territorial rights because it is landlocked, economically ambitious, demographically powerful or strategically dependent on access to another country’s territory, then the entire African state system becomes vulnerable.

What happens to Eritrea today could become a precedent for another African nation tomorrow.

Sovereignty Is Not a Bargaining Chip

Eritrea claims no territory belonging to another state. It seeks peaceful, mutually beneficial relations with Ethiopia and with all its neighbors.

But peace does not require surrendering sovereignty.
Cooperation does not mean territorial submission.
Trade does not mean ownership.
And access to a port does not mean sovereignty over the territory of another country.

Eritrea’s sovereignty is not a geopolitical bargaining chip. It is an internationally recognized right.

And that is why this debate matters far beyond Eritrea.

Defending Eritrea’s territorial integrity is ultimately about defending a principle that every African nation depends upon: no state should be entitled to challenge the sovereignty of another simply because it is larger, more powerful or strategically ambitious.

Eritrea is sovereign. Its territorial integrity is not negotiable. And Africa’s sovereignty must never become a bargaining chip in geopolitical competition.

Since April 2023, Sudan has been engulfed in a devastating war. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are fighting for power and control of the country. For civilians, the conflict has created a humanitarian catastrophe of historic proportions.

More than 13 million people have been displaced, according to figures cited in the source material. Around nine million have been displaced within Sudan, while approximately 4.5 million have sought refuge in neighboring countries, including Chad, South Sudan and Egypt.
At the same time, millions of people are facing hunger. Access to food, medicine and other essential supplies has collapsed or been severely disrupted across many parts of the country.

El Obeid: A City Under Enormous Pressure

The situation is particularly alarming in El Obeid, a major city in central Sudan. With a normal population of around 500,000, the city is under enormous pressure as it receives large numbers of displaced people.
According to the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), more than 100,000 people in the area are already receiving assistance.
Humanitarian operations, however, are being severely affected by insecurity, fuel shortages and dangerous transport routes.
Food deliveries cannot always be carried out reliably. For people who have already fled their homes and lost almost everything, every additional day without secure access to food and basic necessities becomes a struggle for survival.

The United Nations has therefore warned of a further deterioration of the humanitarian situation.

Pope Leo XIV Calls for Humanitarian Corridors Pope Leo XIV has also expressed deep concern over the situation in Sudan, particularly the crisis in El Obeid.
He called on those responsible to guarantee humanitarian corridors for civilians, allowing desperately needed assistance to reach affected communities.
At the same time, he appealed to the international community to support efforts toward an immediate ceasefire.
The Pope’s appeal highlights the urgency of the situation. Without safe access to affected areas, humanitarian organizations can operate only under extremely difficult conditions.

Darfur Remains Gripped by Violence

Severe violence continues to be reported from Darfur.
According to Emergency Lawyers, 35 people were killed in a drone strike on the village of Garra al-Sawaja, which was reportedly under RSF control.
According to the reports, civilians had gathered there to attend traditional hearings concerning local cases and disputes.
Among those reportedly killed were four tribal leaders and two RSF commanders.
The incident once again demonstrates how dangerous the situation has become for civilians. Even places where communities are attempting to maintain local structures and a degree of normal life are not protected from the violence.

Millions Trapped Between Hunger and Displacement

The war has devastated large parts of the country and forced millions of people from their homes.
Many displaced Sudanese are living in camps or makeshift shelters. Others have crossed international borders in search of safety.
Countries such as Chad and South Sudan are themselves facing serious humanitarian challenges. Hosting large numbers of refugees places additional pressure on already fragile systems.
The consequences of the Sudan war therefore extend far beyond the country’s borders. It has become a regional humanitarian crisis.

A Power Struggle with Devastating Consequences

At the center of the conflict are the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF. While the armed parties fight for political and military control, civilians continue to bear the heaviest burden.
Homes have been destroyed, families separated and livelihoods wiped out. Hospitals and other essential services have been severely disrupted in many areas.
For millions of Sudanese people, the war is not an abstract political struggle. It means hunger, fear, displacement and the loss of their livelihoods.

The International Community Cannot Look Away

The humanitarian crisis in Sudan must not become a forgotten crisis.
The international community must continue working to protect civilians, establish safe humanitarian corridors and ensure humanitarian organizations can reach people in need.
At the same time, serious diplomatic efforts are needed to end the fighting and create a path toward a political settlement.
A ceasefire alone will not undo the devastation caused by the war. But it could create the urgently needed space to expand humanitarian assistance, protect civilians and prevent further bloodshed.

Sudan Needs More Than Headlines

Behind every statistic are human beings.
Behind the millions of displaced people are families who were forced to abandon their homes. Behind the hunger figures are children and adults who do not know where their next meal will come from. Behind every report of a death is a person with a family, hopes and a life destroyed by war.

Sudan is facing a humanitarian catastrophe of enormous proportions.

The international community must not wait until another city falls or another massacre makes international headlines.
Sudan needs attention. Sudan needs humanitarian assistance. And above all, Sudan needs peace.

Sources

– Agence France-Presse (AFP) — reporting on the situation in Sudan
– United Nations (UN) — humanitarian situation and conditions in El Obeid
– World Food Programme (WFP) — hunger, displacement and humanitarian assistance in Sudan
– Vatican News — statements and appeals by Pope Leo XIV
– Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) — humanitarian situation in El Obeid
– Emergency Lawyers — reports concerning human rights violations and attacks in Sudan